Introduction - Primer: What had happened prior to 9/11

The account of 9/11 and interaction between the al Qaeda terrorists and the CIA began in December 1999, when the NSA recorded a conversation from a phone in Yemen. This phone number was found in the back pocket of a terrorists who had taken part in the bombing of the embassies in east Africa in 1998. He had been uncovered because he had shrapnel in his back, indicating that he had been running away from the suicide attack on the embassies. The NSA concluded that this phone number was a number for the communications switch board for the east Africa attacks.

A conversation overheard on this phone in December 1999 described an important al Qaeda planning meeting about to take place in Kuala Lumpur and that Khalid, Nawaf and Saleem, thought to ne Nawaf's younger brother, were going to be traveling to this meeting. This information was sent to the CIA, the FBI HQ and to the FBI New York office. When Khalid passed through Dubai, his passport and passport photograph were photocopied by the CIA and this information sent to the CIA Bin Laden unit, the CIA and FBI Headquartersm including the top managers at the CIA and FBI. Khalid was identified from his passport as Khalid al-Mihdhar. Also noted when this information was sent to the CIA HQ was the fact that Khalid al-Mihdhar had a multi-entry visa for the US and his destination was listed as New York City.

On January 3, 2000 the al Qaeda terrorists tried to bomb the USS the Sullivans in Aden, Yemen. The boat used in the attack sank because the explosives were far too heavy for the size of the boat they had used. Because a high level meeting was just about to start in Kuala Lumpur, several people that had taken part in the bombing of the USS the Sullivans were sent off to attend this meeting. Two of the al Qaeda terrorists who had been part of the attack on the Sullivans failed to get proper visas for Malaysia, and they became stuck in Bangkok while trying to reach the meeting in Kuala Lumpur. One of these terrorists was named Fahad al-Quso.

The al Qaeda meeting took place in Kuala Lumpur on January 5, 2000 and lasted to January 8, 2000. This information and the importance of this al Qaeda meeting was communicated to many people including several high level managers at the CIA and the FBI including CIA Director George Tenet and FBI Director Louis Freeh. All of the people who attended this meeting were photographed by the Malaysian Special Branch, the Malaysian intelligence unit, at the request of the CIA and many were identified as long time al Qaeda terrorists. These photographs were sent on January 9, 2000 to the CIA and CIA Director George Tenet and CTC Manager Cofer Black. When this meeting ended on January 8, 2000, the CIA found out that Nawaf and Khalid al-Mihdhar along with one other al Qaeda terrorist who had attended this meeting had boarded a flight to Bangkok. The CIA identified Nawaf as Nawaf al-Hazmi from the manifest for this flight.

After the Cole bombing in October 2000, the FBI New York office, headed by John O'Neill assigned a young FBI agent Ali Soufan, at the time only 29 years old, to head up the Cole bombing investigation. He was sent his off to Yemen in October 2000 to head up the investigation of the Cole bombing. Soufan had been assigned to this position because he had been born in Lebanon and was one the very few FBI agents that spoke fluent Arabic. FBI Special Agent Steve Bongardt was designated to be his assistant, and to stay behind in the FBI New Office to head up an entire team of FBI criminal investigators working on the Cole bombing investigation.

After the Cole bombing, the Yemen authorities quickly arrested Fahad al-Quso and learned from him that he had been assigned to photograph the attack on the Cole, but when he over slept he missed the attack. The Yemen authorities found out from Quso that a high level al Qaeda terrorist named Tawifq Bin Attash, nick named Khallad had purchased the boat used in the attack on the Cole. Khallad was an al Qaeda nick name meaning the one with one leg. Yemen authorities also found out that Fahad al-Quso had attempted to travel to Kuala Lumpur on January 6, 2000, after the failed attempt on the USS the Sullivans, to deliver money to Khallad.

FBI Agent Soufan was given this information by the Yemen authorities including a passport photograph of Khallad and knew that a high level al Qaeda terrorist with one leg named Khallad was already well known by the FBI. He also concluded that it was likely Khallad had to have been one of the masterminds behind the Cole bombing. Soufan also learned that Khallad had flown over to Bangkok on January 8, 2000 from Kuala Lumpur to pick up the money Quso was bringing from Yemen. To get further information Soufan made several contacts over the next many months to the CIA, to find out what the CIA knew about Khallad and if they were aware of a al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.

Who else in the US government and mainstream news media knows about this horrific information?

This information along with the book, "Prior Knowledge of 9/11", was given to the following people in the US Senate on September 12, 2008 on the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Senator Dianne Feinstein California
Senator Bill Nelson Florida
Senator Evin Bayh Indiana
Senator Saxby Chandliss Georgia
Senator Chuck Haggel Nebraska
Senator Russell Finegold Wisconsin
Senator Orian Hatch Utah
Senator Ron Wyden Oregon

This information has also been given to Tim Roemer, a 9-11 commissioner.
Phone: 201-682-1800 ext. 116

This information has also been given to:
The New York Times, Washington Bureau, Phone: 1-202-862-0300
The Washington Post Phone: 1-202-334-6000, and
The Los Angeles Times, Washington Bureau, Phone: 1-202-824-8331

This information also included the source documents to clearly show that the CIA had been criminally culpable in allowing the attacks on 9/11.

So what are all of these people and important organizations doing with this horrific information?

ASK THEM!

See the book "Prior Knowledge of 9/11" for more in depth information on this.

Why we can't move on from the events on 9/11?

The events on 9/11 were the most traumatic for the United States in this century. We cannot move on until we have learned the lessons of 9/11 and effected the changes needed to keep the American people safe from future terrorist attacks. So what are the real lessons of 9/11, what lessons can we learn?

The 9/11 Commission told us we need to have more imagination. But from the account of 9/11 in "Prior Knowledge of 9/11" it is clear that criminal elements had taken over at the CIA, and had subjugated groups at FBI Headquarters so they could hide critical information from the investigators on the Cole bombing and later shut down investigations of al Qaeda terrorists found to be inside of the US.

The investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi was shut down by CIA officer Tom Wilshire and FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi. First they hid from the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing the photograph of Khallad, taken at Kuala Lumpur. The FBI criminal investigators knew Khallad had been the mastermind of the Cole bombing. But without that photograph of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur, Bongardt could not directly connect Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing, even though he knew both Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at an al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur and knew that Mihdhar and Hazmi were al Qaeda terrorists inside of the US. In spite of not having this photograph, Bongardt still felt since all of these terrorists were known to have been in Kuala Lumpur at the exact same time, that he enough information to start an investigate and search for Mihdhar and Hazmi.

He clearly knew when he found out that they were inside of the US on August 28, 2001 that theses al Qaeda terrorists were inside the US to take part in a huge al Qaeda attack since both of these long time al Qaeda terrorists had been involved in the east Africa bombings that had killed over 200 people.

But FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi told Bongardt on August 28, 2001, that he would not be allowed to take part in any investigation of Mihdhar or Hazmi since the information on Mihdhar would have to come from the NSA and caveats on the front page of NSA information said that this information could not be shared with FBI criminal investigators without written permission from the NSA, since it might have been obtained with FISA search warrant.

But Corsi told Bongardt that he could never be part of any investigation of Mihdhar on August 28, 2001, after she had already received a written release from the NSA caveats from the NSA that very morning. Bongardt was sure that the NSA information had not been connected to a FISA warrant and requested that Corsi get a legal opinion from the NSLU attorneys at FBI Headquarters on this issue. He was confident because no FISA information was involved, that they would rule he could immediately investigate and find Mihdhar before Mihdhar had time to carry out a horrific terrorist attack inside of the US.

But Corsi called on August 29, 2001 and told Bongardt the NSLU had ruled that Bongardt could have nothing to do with any investigation of Mihdhar. But from information entered into the Moussaoui trial we know that Corsi fabricated this legal opinion from the NSLU attorneys. They had ruled the opposite and in fact had ruled and had even told Corsi that Bongardt could take part in any investigation for Mihdhar since the NSA information had not been obtained using any FISA warrant.

Bongardt was unaware that Corsi had fabricated this ruling. As requested by Corsi, he destroyed all of the information he had on Mihdhar and stopped all attempts to further investigate Mihdhar. He and his team had been blocked from taking part in any investigation that could have found Mihdhar in time to head off what was Bongardt clearly thought was going to be a horrific al Qaeda attack inside of the US.

It is now clear that the process of getting a ruling from NSLU attorneys was flawed. FBI HQ agents in this case Dina Corsi were able to talk to NSLU attorneys at FBI HQ when a ruling was requested by FBI field agents with no input to this process from the field agent, in this case, FBI Agent Steve Bongardt. FBI HQ agents were then able to give the legal running back to Bongardt orally, with no written record. Corsi had been working with Tom Wilshire, CIA former deputy chief at the Bin Laden unit at the CIA, to shut down the FBI criminal investigation of Mihdhar by FBI Agent Steve Bongardt and his team of Cole bombing investigators. Corsi was able to shut down Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar by first hiding the NSA release from the NSA caveats and by then fabricating the NSLU ruling. Both Corsi and Wilshire were involved in criminally obstructing not only Bongardt's Cole bombing investigation but also his investigation of Mihdhar, allowing the al Qaeda terrorist to murder almost 3000 Americans on 9/11.

This process should be fixed. Both the FBI field investigators that want a NSLU ruling and the FBI HQ agent who is blocking his investigation should both be present at any NSLU hearing where this issue is argued in front of a NSLU attorney. This hearing should be transcribed with a written ruling given back to the FBI field agent.

Had this been done in this case, Corsi never could have taken this investigation of Mihdhar away from Bongardt and the 3000 people killed on 9/11 would be alive today.

Had this process been in effect with the investigation of Harry Samit in Minneapolis of Zacarias Moussaoui, it is also possible that criminal elements at FBI HQ who at the very same time were sabotaging Samit's investigation by denying him a search warrant for Moussaoui's possessions would not have gotten away with criminally blocking Samit's investigation, an investigation that also would have prevented the attacks on 9/11.

Why did the 9/11 Commission not come up with this very obvious change to FBI procedures to obtain a legal ruling at FBI HQ?

For the 9/11 Commission to recommend this change to FBI procedures they would have had to show that Corsi had criminally fabricated this ruling from the NSLU attorney, Sherry Sabol. But they were chartered to do an investigation of 9/11 that blamed no one, even people at the CIA and FBI HQ who they found had criminally allowed the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out these attacks, by blocking all investigations of al Qaeda terrorists found inside of the US!

See the book "Prior Knowledge of 9/11" for more in depth information on this.

Why did the 9/11 Commission not find this information?

We now know that this explosive new information added to the other government accounts of 9/11 was able to provide enough information to build an accurate picture of what had allowed the attacks on 9/11 to take place. This information was what had been missing from the 9/11 Commission account of 9/11, in order to put the entire story of 9/11 together.

This new information clearly details the crimes committed by the CIA and FBI HQ agents in obstructing the FBI investigation of the USS Cole after it had been bombed in Yemen. By concealing this information, the 9/11 Commission was able to hide the crimes committed by many groups at the CIA and FBI HQ who had obstructed the FBI investigation of the Cole bombing. It is now clear that the charter of the 9/11 Commission was to show that no one in the US government had committed any crime in allowing the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out the attacks on 9/11. But it is now impossible to believe that the 9/11 Commission did not have this information. It is also clear that they made sure this information would not see the light of day and was kept hidden from the American people.

Since the 9/11 Commission had access to the DOJ/FBI IG report at the very same time they were doing their own investigation, any augment the 9/11 Commission might have why they did not have these documents has no credibility.

Are we to believe that the DOJ/FBI Inspector General did not know who FBI Agent Ali Soufan was when Soufan was the lead investigator on the Cole bombing? THIS IS NOT CREDIBLE!

See the book "Prior Knowledge of 9/11" for more in depth information on this.

Why is this information so explosive?

First, the documents now on this web site are the source documents that come from the US government. The account of FBI Agent Ali Soufan is an account dictated to Lawrence Wright by FBI Special Agent Steven Bongardt, Soufan’s assistant on the Cole bombing. All of the information in this account of Ali Soufan was vetted by John Miller, information officer at the FBI. So this account can be considered to be the official FBI record of the interaction between Soufan, his Cole bombing investigating team, and the CIA and FBI HQ prior to the attacks on 9/11.

This information conclusively demonstrates that the CIA had not only criminally obstructed the FBI investigation of the USS Cole many times, but then they had criminally sabotaged any chance FBI Agent Steven Bongardt would have to be able to investigate and find Mihdhar and Hazmi in time, when he was told that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the US and knew they were going to take part in a horrific al Qaeda attack that would kill thousands of Americans.

Verifying documentation: Did the CIA prevent the FBI from preventing 9-11? by Lawrence Wright

See the book "Prior Knowledge of 9/11" for more in depth information on this.

Conclusions

CIA managers and officers, working with agents at FBI Headquarters they had subjugated, criminally obstructed the FBI investigation of the Cole bombing on numerous times, starting from November 2000 by hiding from the FBI criminal investigators the information on the al Qaeda planning meeting that took place in Kuala Lumpur from January 5-8, 2000, and the fact that this meeting had been attended by Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Tawfiq Bin Attash, also known as Khallad, the mastermind of the Cole bombing.

This is not only where the Cole bombing had been planned, but also where the attacks on 9/11 had also been planned. In November 2000, Soufan gave the Yemen CIA station a passport photo of Khallad with his official request for information from the CIA on any information the CIA had on Khallad Bin Attash and on any meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.

When Khallad was identified by the FBI/CIA joint source in December 2000 as a high level al Qaeda terrorist, the CIA had the FBI/CIA source look at photographs taken at Kuala Lumpur of both Mihdhar and Khallad in January 2001. Khallad was immediately identified from these photographs as having been at that meeting with both Mihdhar and Hazmi.

The CIA at this point not only knew that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing at Kuala Lumpur, but the CIA themselves were culpable in allowing that bombing to take place for having photographed the terrorists at that meeting, and then allowing them to leave this meeting, with no effort to identify what they had been up to or where they went after this meeting.

Once the CIA was aware that they, themselves had been culpable in the Cole bombing, they started a wide ranging criminal conspiracy to keep this information away from FBI criminal investigators on the FBI Cole bombing investigation.

But the horror story of all horror stories is when the CIA officers and the FBI HQ agents with whom they were working, found out both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US on August 22, 2001, they immediately knew these al Qaeda terrorists were in the US to take part in a huge al Qaeda attack.

Yet, they continued to hide the information on this meeting and the people who had attended this meeting from the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing. FBI HQ agents who were part of this criminal conspiracy went so far as to conceal the fact that they had obtained a written release from NSA caveats, even before they told FBI agents on the Cole bombing investigation that they could not take part in any investigation of Mihdhar due to the NSA caveats. These FBI HQ agents then fabricated the ruling from NSLU attorneys, claiming the NSLU attorney, Sherry Sabole had ruled they could not take part in any investigation of Mihdhar when in fact Sabol had ruled that the Cole bombing investigators could take part in any investigation of Mihdhar. These FBI HQ agents and the CIA managers they were working with knew this would shut down the only effective investigation that could have found Mihdhar and Hazmi quickly.

Because both these CIA officers and FBI HQ agents knew a huge attack that was about to occur inside of the US, they clearly knew that by shutting down this investigation oif Mihdhar by the FBI Cole investigators, thousands of Americans were going to perish in these attacks, as a direct result of their actions.

See the book "Prior Knowledge of 9/11" for more in depth information on this.

Testimony of Attorney Sherry Sabol to FBI IG investigators on November 7, 2002

"She (Sherry Sabol) denies advising that the agent (FBI Agent Steve Bongardt) could not participate in an interview and notes that she would not have given such inaccurate advice. The attorney (Sherry Sabol) told investigators that the NSA caveats would not have precluded criminal agents from joining in any search for Mihdhar... Moreover she (Sabol) said that she (FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi) could have gone to the NSA and obtained a waiver of any such caveat because there was no FISA information involved in this case (the original reason for the NSA caveats)." This information was from testimony by NSLU attorney Sherry Sabol given to DOJ IG investigators on November 7, 2002

Verifying documentation: 9-11 Commission Report, Page 538, Footnote 81

See the book "Prior Knowledge of 9/11" for more in depth information on this.